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There seems to be widespread agreement, in the current philosophical literature, that what it is to be 
morally responsible for something is to be deserving of  certain consequences on account of  that 
thing.1  It is a natural enough thought.  We can call it the “merited-consequences” conception of  
responsibility.  “Blame” is then used to refer to a large range of  consequences that one might merit 
in cases of  moral failure: judgment, criticism, sanctions, opprobrium, attitudes such as resentment or 
indignation, alterations in one’s interpersonal relationships, etc.    
I have come to think there is something off, or askew, in thinking of  moral responsibility in this 
way, though I find it hard to articulate clearly just what it is.  It seems to me that the kind of  moral 
responsibility the merited-consequences conception is trying to capture could be better captured by 
noting the characteristic way in which certain minds can rightly matter to other such minds—the 
way in which certain minds can carry a certain kind of  importance, an importance that is made 
manifest in certain sorts of  responses.  Mattering, not meriting, is what seems to me central.  
However, since I cannot yet better articulate the alternative, I will continue in the merited-
consequences framework.  I would like to focus on a particular class of  the consequences one might 
merit, in response to moral failing: certain responses to moral failing are non-voluntary, in a sense I 
will explain below.  The non-voluntariness of  these reactions has two important upshots.  First, 
questions about their justification will be complex.  Second, because they are non-voluntary, they are 
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1 Or, more exactly, to responsible is to be such that certain consequences might be deserved or merited or appropriate.  
Recently the “meriting” or “appropriateness” relation has received some scrutiny.  See, for example, the positions 
outlined in the introduction to Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith, eds., The Nature of  Moral 
Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 9–12.  In addition to the notion of  “basic desert” favored 
by Derk Pereboom, an idea of  “fittingness” has been advanced by Michael Zimmerman, and an “alethic” relation by 
Gideon Rosen.   See Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).; 
Gideon Rosen, "The Alethic Conception of  Moral Responsibility," in The Nature of  Moral Responsibility, ed. Randolph 
Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Michael J. Zimmerman, 
"Varieties of  Moral Responsibility," in The Nature of  Moral Repsonsibility, ed. Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and 
Angela M. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
not well thought of  as consequences voluntarily imposed upon the wrongdoer by the responder.  By 
focusing on merited consequences and over-looking non-voluntariness, we risk misunderstanding 
the significance of  moral criticism and of  certain reactions to moral failure. 
1. JUSTIFYING RESPONSES TO MORAL FAILURE  
1.1 WHICH RESPONSES?
To start, let us consider responses to moral failure, and, for that, let us start with Gary Watson’s 
landmark paper, “Two Faces of  Responsibility.”2  That paper is a response to Susan Wolf ’s criticisms 
of  what she calls “Real Self ” views—views that say, roughly, that you are responsible for the outputs 
of  your real self, simply because they reflect your real self.3  Wolf  made two criticisms: first, Real Self 
views do not account for the depth and force of  moral criticism and, second, they do not take into 
account the unfairness of  blaming someone who lacks the ability to become a better “real self.”  
Watson replies by dividing responsibility into two faces:  What he calls the “aretaic face” of  
responsibility concerns an evaluation of  the real self: an evaluation of  the agent and those choices 
attributable to them.  Watson argues, against Wolf ’s first criticism, that negative aretaic evaluations 
do carry a kind of  depth and force.  He agrees that aretaic evaluations are not sensitive to concerns 
of  fairness, but he suggests that this is as it should be, because concerns of  fairness appear instead 
when considering the “accountability face,” the aspect of  responsibility that involves making 
demands, imposing sanctions, and what he calls “holding accountable.”    
I would like to consider the idea of  a sanction in more detail—and, in the end, to make it more 
exacting than what Watson likely had in mind.  To sanction someone is, as Watson agrees, to impose 
something unpleasant or unwanted upon that person in response to his or her violation of  some 
some norm, demand, or expectation.  In holding accountable, he says, we “lay it down” that a 
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2 Gary Watson, "Two Faces of  Responsibility," Philosophical Topics 24, no. 2 (1996).
3 Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chapter 2.
certain consequence will follow if  the standard isn’t met. (236–7)  This seems true of  sanctions.  
Sanctions are consequences that are created and attached to certain failures in certain contexts.  Parents 
sanction or penalize children for misbehaving; society penalizes its members for violating civil law; 
nations impose sanctions on other nations for pursuing weapons programs; teachers penalize 
students for turning in work late.  We even create and impose sanctions and penalties in games and 
sports.4  
In contrast, a hangover is not a sanction for drinking too much.  It is just a negative 
consequence.  Similarly, the big mess in your kitchen is a negative consequence of  last night’s dinner 
party.  The fact that you have to clean up that mess is not a sanction for having the party.  It is just 
your job, and no one else’s.5  Sanctions are not simply negative consequences that no one else is 
required to bear for you.  They are negative consequences that have been created or instituted and 
attached, by some person or body, to certain violations or shortcomings.  As such, they trigger 
concerns of  fairness.  As Watson points out, “It is unfair to impose sanctions upon people unless 
they have a reasonable opportunity to avoid incurring them.” (237)
How, then, are sanctions justified, morally?  In What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon 
provides a compelling answer:  They are justified in the way actions are usually justified.  Or, rather, 
according to Scanlon, actions are usually justified by appeal to contractualist reasoning, and this is 
also the way that both the institution and the imposition of  a sanction will be justified.6  But one 
need not accept the details of  Scanlon’s contractualism to see the appeal of  understanding the 
3
4 Note that, so understood, sanctions need not have any distinctively moral significance.  I will consider the idea that 
blame is a sanction imposed within the social institution called “morality” later.  
5 It is what Scanlon would call a “substantive responsibility”—a question of  where obligations and burdens fall.  I am, 
here, distinguishing sanctions from other (or mere) substantive responsibilities.  
6 See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), chapter 6.  In the 
context of  that work, sanctions are instances of  “substantive responsibilities:” benefits, burdens, and risks to be 
distributed according to ordinary contractualist reasoning.  For Scanlon “substantive responsibilities” sharply contrast 
with what Scanlon there called “responsibility as attributability” and now calls “moral reaction responsibility.”  (For the 
latter, see "Forms and Conditions of  Responsibility," in The Nature of  Moral Responsibility, ed. Randolph Clarke, Michael 
McKenna, and Angela M. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
justification of  creating a sanction to be, broadly speaking, a question about the creation or 
modification of  a kind of  social institution and the justification of  imposing a sanction to be the 
justification of  an ordinary action, in that institutional context.  As noted by Watson, sanctions will 
be subject to concerns about whether their target had an adequate opportunity to avoid them, and 
so subject to concerns of  fairness, but, we can now say that the notion of  “adequate opportunity” 
will be constrained by the realities of  the situation and the competing needs and interests of  
everyone affected.  A student who claims they lacked fair opportunity to avoid the late penalty on 
their paper because the world is governed by deterministic causal laws will be disappointed.  The 
justification of  a sanction is, so to speak, political or institutional, not metaphysical.
Notice that, if  we could maintain the Watsonian division into two faces, then the justification of  
responses to moral failing would be relatively straightforward—or, at least, it would be relatively 
clear how we should proceed in our theorizing.  The first face concerns evaluations.  An evaluation 
is justified in the way a belief  is—roughly, by appeal to evidence and standards of  epistemic 
reasoning.  Philosophers think we know something about evidence and standards of  epistemic 
reasoning.  If  we could maintain the division into two faces, then anything beyond mere evaluation 
would be understood as a kind of  sanction, to be justified in the way that political or institutional 
structures and the actions within them are justified.  And, again, we, as philosophers, have some 
thoughts about the justification of  political and institutional structures and actions within them.  
And so, if  we could maintain this division, we would have, available to us, two familiar frameworks 
for thinking about the justification of  responses to moral failing.
1.2 BEYOND TWO FACES
Unfortunately, though, two faces are too few.7  Mere evaluation does not fully capture blame, but the 
remaining responses are not all well characterized as sanctions—at least not once we understand 
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7 See, e.g., Angela M. Smith, "Moral Blame and Moral Protest," in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, ed. Justin Coates and Neal 
Tognazzini (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).   For a three-fold division, see David Shoemaker, 
"Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of  Moral Responsibility," Ethics 121 (2011).
sanctions in the more exacting way I have suggested.  And so we cannot avail ourselves of  existing 
theorizing about epistemic justification, on the one hand, and the justification of  creating and 
imposing sanctions, on the other.  Instead, the justification of  responses to moral failing must 
involve the messy middle ground between belief  and action.
The remaining responses to moral failing include the “reactive attitudes” that P. F. Strawson put 
at center-stage: resentment, guilt, indignation, gratitude, trust, admiration.8  Scanlon expands the 
category of  “reactive attitude” to include such things as “withdrawal of  trust” and a “decreased 
readiness to enter into special relations of  friendship,” or to help a person with his projects, or to 
take pleasure in things going well for the person and to feel sad or regretful when they do not.9  
Others (prominently Michael McKenna and more recently Miranda Fricker) have noted the 
importance and role of  communication in holding responsible.10  We might also consider the 
possibility of  a kind of  moral judgment or condemnation, in a sense that goes beyond mere belief  
or evaluation, or what R. Jay Wallace calls “opprobrium”.11 
The important point, for present purposes, is that many (though not all) of  these remaining 
responses are non-voluntary, in a sense I am about to explain.  Moreover, they must be non-
voluntary, in this way, to play the roles they play and bear the significance they bear in our lives.
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8 See Peter F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003).
9 Scanlon, "Forms and Conditions of  Responsibility," 92.
10 Michael McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  Miranda Fricker, "What's 
the Point of  Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation," Noûs 50, no. 1 (2016).
11 Watson is, I think, the first to break contemporary ground on the rich topic of  judgmentalness.  See Gary Watson, 
"Standing in Judgment," in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, ed. Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  For opprobrium, see R. Jay Wallace, "Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive 
Sentiments," in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of  T. M. Scanlon, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and 
Samuel Freeman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
1.3 THE NON-VOLUNTARY12
The words “voluntary” and “involuntary” can be put to a variety of  different uses, each important.  
To locate the sense currently at issue, let us start with what might seem to be a kind of  spectrum 
between the clearly active and the clearly passive.13  At the clearly active end stand ordinary actions, 
like raising your right hand, planting azaleas, or running for office.  These seem clearly things you do. 
At the other extreme stand the (relatively) clear cases of  passivity.  These include not only being 
blown by the wind, succumbing to disease, and winning the lottery, but also having a headache, 
hearing a ringing in your ears, or seeing spots.  These are things you did not choose and are not up 
to you.  Between these extremes, it seems, stand an interesting class of  states of  mind: states which 
appear passive, when contrasted with ordinary intentional actions, but which seem active, when 
contrasted with sensations or perceptions.  
The starkest example is believing.  Believing is importantly unlike raising your right hand or 
running for office, in that you cannot believe “voluntarily” or “at will,” in the following specific 
sense:  While you can raise your right hand or run for office for any reason that you think shows it 
worth doing—to win a bet, or make a joke, or make a point—you cannot believe something (e.g., 
that the butler did it) in order to win a bet, make a joke, or make a point—even if  you think it would 
be worth doing.  You can only believe what you take to be true.  You are constrained, in your 
believing, in a way that you are not, in your acting.  Thus, compared to action, believing seems 
passive. 
On the other hand, believing is importantly unlike having a headache or seeing spots.  What you 
believe, what you take to be true, is, in a certain way, up to you.  If  you think appearances are 
deceiving, you will not believe your eyes.  If, upon considering the evidence, you change your mind 
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12 Some material from this section is repeated, with minor modifications, in "Reasoning First," in Routledge Handbook of  
Practical Reasoning, ed. Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvan (in process).  It will appear in Minds that Matter (in progress).
13 It is useful, rhetorically, to start with the idea of  a spectrum.  In the end, it should be rejected.  Thanks to Richard 
Moran for pressing this point. 
about the butler’s guilt, you will no longer believe him guilty.  Our beliefs reflect or embody our 
thoughts—in particular, our thoughts about what is so.  And thinking is something we do.  As 
thinkers, we do not simply suffer or experience our beliefs, in the way we suffer a headache or 
experience a visual illusion.  Our beliefs are up to us in the way that our answer to a question is up to 
us—where, by an answer to a question, I do not mean an oral or written response to a question 
(which is an ordinary action), but rather the resolution of  a question arrived at in one’s own mind, 
that which an oral or written response might or might not sincerely express.  When you answer a 
question, your answer is not simply out of  your control.  You may arrive at it with some care.  And 
your answer is up to you: it will change with your changing assessment of  the subject matter.  
Although you are constrained, in your answer, by your own assessment of  the subject matter, it is 
your own assessment that determines your answer.
Moreover, the assumption that our beliefs are up to us in this way makes sense of  our practice 
of  asking others to defend their beliefs, to provide us with their reasons for believing.  If  we ask 
someone why she has a headache or hears a ringing in her ears, we expect an account of  what 
produced this state of  discomfort.  But if  we ask someone why she believes the butler did it, we 
expect to be given, not an explanation of  the history of  a particular mental episode, but something 
quite different: a present case for the butler’s guilt, a case to support the belief.  That is to say, we 
accept, as an explanation for her state of  mind, considerations that bear on a very different subject 
matter; we accept, as an explanation for the psychological state of  the person standing before us, 
considerations that bear on a subject matter removed in space and time—facts about the butler, his 
access to the home, his motives, etc.  Moreover, if  we think the reasons the person provides are 
inadequate, we will criticize the person for their state of  mind—we will think they ought to revise it.  
We might, in addition, offer to them similarly remote reasons and expect the person to respond by 
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forming a different, or opposing, belief.  All of  this would be unthinkable, if  we did not understand 
her state of  mind as up to her in the way her answers up to her.14
So, belief  is not active in the way an ordinary intentional action is, it is not voluntary, but it is not 
passive in the way that perception and sensation are—nor is it involuntary in the way digestion or 
blinking or accidents are.  It is up to you in the way your answer to a question is up to you.  Thus I 
will say that believing is non-voluntary.  It is, I think, a non-voluntary activity.  Many other states of  
mind—indeed, many of  those we find most important—are also non-voluntary.  I would include, in 
this wide category, intentions, decisions, and attitudes such as resentment, gratitude, trust, 
admiration, contempt, and satisfaction at a job well done.  These are, like belief, attitudes for which 
we can be asked our reasons, but which we cannot adopt at will. 
I would characterize these non-voluntary attitudes as forms of  question-answering—it is this 
form, I think, that gives applicability to the request for one’s reasons.  In saying this, in saying that to 
believe P, for example, is to answer the question of  whether P, or that to intend to x is to answer the 
question of  whether to x, I do not mean to posit a new, independent psychological event or activity, 
the answering of  a question, that somehow accompanies believing or intending.  Rather, I mean to 
claim that belief  and intention, themselves, are helpfully thought of  as question-answerings; 
question-answering is something like a genus into which these attitudes fall as species.  
If  we see these activities as question-answerings, we can say why they are not voluntary in the 
sense specified: your reasons for them will be the reasons you take to bear on the relevant question.  
You will believe P for reasons you take to show that P; you will intend to x for reasons that you take 
to bear sufficiently on whether to x.  But, of  course, you might take yourself  to have other reasons: 
perhaps you could get a good night’s sleep if  only you could believe everything will be okay.   You 
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14 The point is made by Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001).  Note, too, we will criticize the person if  the reasons given are inadequate.  We might present 
other, similarly remote, considerations and expect the person to form some other, or contrary, belief  in response.  This 
would, again, be unthinkable, if  we did not understand the state of  mind as in some way an answer to the question on 
which those reasons bear.
cannot believe everything will be okay for this reason, because you cannot answer a question for 
reasons you do not take to bear on it:  If  you were to answer the question for that reason, you would 
have therein taken it to bear on the question.15  Thus, belief  is non-voluntary.16
It turns out the same is true of  intention.  You might have reason that you take to be sufficient 
reason to intend to x—reason enough to house the intention—but that you do not take to be reason 
enough to x—not reason enough to act.  Perhaps you have no intention of  marrying your partner, 
and they are very unhappy about this fact.  Because you like to please your partner, you would be 
happy to house the intention—so long as you do not need to actually go through with the marriage.  
You are out of  luck.  In order to intend to marry, you have to decide to marry—to intend, you must 
answer the question of  whether to act, not just the question of  whether to intend.  And so, even 
though you take yourself  to have reason enough to intend, you will not be able to intend.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, although you can act at will—though you can act for any reason you take to show the 
action sufficiently worth doing—you can no more intend at will than you can believe at will.  While 
actions are voluntary, intentions are not.17
Notice that attitudes that are non-voluntary in this specific sense, are also, and therefore, subject 
to a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem: you might find yourself  with reasons that you take to show 
them worth having that you do not take to bear on the relevant questions.  Getting a good night’s 
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15 Importantly, to take a consideration to bear on a question is not to form a belief  about the consideration, the 
question, and the “bearing on” relation.  It is, rather, to employ the consideration in addressing the question. 
16 I have argued that you cannot believe at will in Pamela Hieronymi, "Controlling Attitudes," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
87, no. 1 (2006); "Believing at Will," Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (2009).
17 The argument that you cannot intend at will appears in "Controlling Attitudes."  The marriage example appears in 
"Responsibility for Believing," Synthese 161, no. 3 (2008); "Reflection and Responsibility," Philosophy and Public Affairs 42, 
no. 1 (2014); "Forgiveness, Blame, Reasons..." in 3am: magazine, ed. Richard Marshall (2013).
rest is the wrong kind of  reason for believing everything will be okay.  The same sort of  problem 
can be generated for any member of  this class.18  
The non-voluntariness of  these attitudes can seem to be an affront to our powers—as though 
there is something we cannot do, because of  some shortfall in our abilities.  But there is no shortfall, 
any more than our inability to draw a square circle represents a shortfall.  The illusion of  shortfall is 
generated by the fact that we are both rational and reflective: we can both answer questions and 
think about our own answers.  We exercise our rational agency by finding reasons sufficient—that is, 
by answering questions and therein forming attitudes.  There is no shortfall here:  We can consider 
any question of  which we can conceive, and we can answer it for any consideration that we take to 
bear sufficiently on it.  By answering certain questions, we therein form certain attitudes.  Because 
we are also reflective creatures, we can also think about our attitudes and notice that they are costly, 
or inconvenient, or that other attitudes would better serve our purposes.  In many cases, we thereby 
encounter reasons of  the wrong kind: reasons that count in favor of  changing our attitudes that we 
do not take to bear, or bear sufficiently, on the relevant question.  We then find ourselves with 
reasons for something that is itself  the kind of  thing done for reasons, and yet unable to do it for 
the reasons we have.  But this inability represents no shortfall: the thing we are unable to do is not, 
itself, a coherent possibility: you cannot answer a question for reasons that you do not take to bear 
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18 I am understanding the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem in the way I have elsewhere, and I will use “wrong kind” 
accordingly.  For a short summary, see "The Use of  Reasons in Thought (and the Use of  Earmarks in Arguments)," 
Ethics 124, no. 1 (2013). 
It is difficult to generate the problem for intention, because there are very few constraints on the reasons for which one 
can act (most any consideration could, in principle, bear on the question of  whether to x) and it is possible to act as a 
way of  making yourself  intend.  (If  you are unhappy that I have no intention to attend your party, I can decide to attend 
your party in order to keep you happy—even if  what you really care about is my intention, not my attendance.)
It may be worth noting that, in the marriage example, pleasing your partner is not exactly the wrong kind of  reason for 
intending, because, if  you thought that housing the intention were reason enough to marry, you could decide to marry in 
order to have the intention.  The reason bears on the question, but you do not take it to be sufficient reason to settle the 
question.  In contrast, the Toxin Puzzle case (Gregory Kavka, "The Toxin Puzzle," Analysis 43 (1983).) and the original 
case of  Mutual Assured Destruction are ones in which the reason to intend does not even bear on the question of  
whether to act, because the reason to intend disappears before the time of  action, and this is known in advance.  These 
cases present reasons that are genuinely of  the “wrong kind”. 
sufficiently on that question.  Why not?  Because, if  you answer a question for a reason, you will 
therein have taken the reason to bear sufficiently on that question.  Being disappointed that we cannot 
answer a question for a reason we do not take to bear sufficiently on it is like being disappointed we 
cannot draw a square circle.  Our feeling of  lack is an illusion generated by the fact that we are able 
both to answer questions and to reflect upon our own answers.19  
Thus the fact that an attitude is non-voluntary, in the sense I have outlined, should not lead us to 
think it is not up to us or that we are passive with respect to it.  These attitudes are up to us in the 
way our answers to questions are up to us—they express our take on things.  Unlike your bone 
structure or birthplace, they change with your changing evaluation of  what is true, good, 
worthwhile, or important.  Unlike your headache or a visual illusion, it makes sense to ask you for 
your reasons for them.  They are not simply out of  your control, even though you cannot adopt 
them for any reason you take to show it worth doing.
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19 This point appears in Hieronymi, "Believing at Will," p. 173.  The editors raise a helpful objection: Grant that we 
cannot settle a question for reasons we do not take to bear on it.  Our disappointment need not be understood as the 
disappointment of  being unable to do this incoherent thing.  Our problem (pleasing our partner, getting some sleep) 
would be solved if  only we could assess the reasons differently—if  we could take them to bear on the question 
sufficiently.  But there is nothing incoherent in the possibility of  assessing the reasons differently.  Someone else may 
take their partner’s desire for an intention to marry to be reason enough to marry, or someone else may think they are a 
kind of  anti-clairvoyant, such that their own anxiety is evidence that everything will work out.  These are coherent 
possibilities, and, if  we were like these people, we would not face our problem.  Thus, it seems, our disappointment lies 
in a genuine shortcoming: we cannot bring ourselves to be like these people, we cannot bring ourselves to assess the 
reasons in this way, and so cannot enter the desired state of  mind.   
In reply, I will first note that whether you can bring yourself to assess the reasons in a different way has not been 
considered.  Sometimes you will be able to do so, sometimes you will not.  Perhaps, by following Pascal’s advice, you can 
come to see your partner’s concern as reason enough to marry, or perhaps, by establishing side bet with your friend, you 
can come to see the prize money as reason enough to drink the toxin.  Being unable to bring yourself  to assess the 
reasons differently is a genuine shortcoming, one you might, or might not, face, and facing it might, or might not, 
disappoint you.  (But, even if  you are able to bring yourself  to assess the reasons differently, you would not, thereby, 
have believed, or intended, at will or voluntarily.  Cf. "Controlling Attitudes.") 
The objector might restate the objection.  Our disappointment lies in a genuine shortcoming: We are unable (now) to 
assess the reasons differently than we do.  But if  this means “…differently than we do assess them, however that may 
be” then we have again reached an incoherence.  If  it means, instead, “…differently we do assess them, namely, we are 
unable to take our partner’s desire to be reason enough to marry,” then it is, I think, false—you could assess the reasons in 
that way.  But you do not: you are committed to a different assessment.  (More needs to be said, on this point.)
1.4  NON-VOLUNTARY REACTIONS TO MORAL FAILURE
Returning, now, to the main line of  thought, armed with this idea of  the non-voluntary: we 
considered Watson’s division into two faces, we made the idea of  a sanction a bit more exacting, and 
then we noticed that not all responses to moral failing can be categorized as either evaluation or 
sanction.  I claimed that some of  the remaining responses are non-voluntary, in the sense just 
explained, and, moreover, that they must be non-voluntary, in this sense, to play the roles they play 
and bear the significance they bear in our lives.
To illustrate the last claim, consider trust and pride.  Trusting (in the sense of  having great 
confidence in) my children, or taking pride in their accomplishments, builds their self-esteem and 
aids their personal development.  Even so, I do not—and could not—feel great confidence in them 
or take pride in their accomplishments in order to build their lagging self-esteem.  If  I attempted to 
do so, my “pride” or “trust” would be inauthentic and so, most likely, ineffective.  To be sure, I can 
express my genuine trust or voice my genuine pride in order to build their self-esteem.  
Communication is voluntary.20  But trust and pride, themselves, are not—they have their own 
reasons, and aiding personal development is not among them.  Moreover, this must be so, if  they are 
to play the roles they play and bear the significance they bear in our lives. 
So, too, with the reactive attitudes Strawson put at center-stage—resentment, gratitude, 
indignation, trust, distrust, admiration, contempt.  These do not, and could not, reflect a person’s all-
things-considered judgment about the best response to have in the situation—as they could, and 
typically would, if  they were voluntary.21  They reflect a person’s take on only certain aspects of  their 
situation.  And that must be so, for them to play the roles they play and bear the significance they 
bear in our lives.  
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20 Or, it is often voluntary. 
21 “Typically,” because of  cases of  weakness of  will.  Voluntary responses reflect a person’s take on the question of  
whether to x, where that question ought to be answered by the same range of  considerations as the question of  whether x 
would be the best response all-things-considered (but sometimes it is not so answered).  In contrast, non-voluntary 
reactions reflect a person’s take on a narrower range of  considerations. 
But, because these attitudes are not sensitive to every aspect of  a person’s situation, a person 
cannot be justified in them by appeal to just any aspect of  the situation, nor, importantly, can their 
justification be challenged by just any aspect.  These attitudes embody your take, not on the all-
things-considered question of  whether it would be best to have those attitudes, but instead on some 
narrower set of  questions which concern (not the attitude itself, but rather) only certain aspects of  
your situation.  And so the question of  whether you have reason to resent, e.g., and therefore the 
question of  whether you are justified in resenting, cannot be answered by appeal to just any aspect 
of  your situation or relationship.  It can be answered only by appeal to a narrower, more specific set 
of  considerations.22  
Exactly what the relevant aspects are, for a given attitude, is a difficult but worthwhile question.  
To illustrate, consider resentment.  We can distinguish between reasons for which one can, so to 
speak, directly revise one’s resentment and other reasons that count against resenting.23  A legitimate 
excuse, something that shows that in fact no disregard was shown, is a reason for which you can 
directly revise your resentment.  In fact, if  you do not, you are being irrational.  In contrast, the fact 
that your resentment is ruining your own happiness is not a reason for which you can directly revise 
your resentment—it is, instead, a reason to take action in order to attempt to rid yourself  of  your 
resentment: to undergo therapy or take medication or at least put some effort into trying to reframe 
or reinterpret your situation.  Notice that the attempt to reframe or reinterpret the situation is, itself, 
an effort to find the right kind of  reason—reasons for which you can directly or rationally revise 
your resentment.  The negative effect on your happiness is a reason to engage in self-management.  
It is not a reason that is internal, so to speak, to resentment—it is the wrong kind of  reason for the 
attitude itself.  
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22 Though I am using the notion of  “question-answering,” at this point, I do not believe it is essential to the point.  
23 I would cash out the metaphor of  “directness” (and of  what is “internal”) in terms of  questions.  (Cf. footnote 38.)
Because a person’s reasons for resenting do not concern her own happiness, facts about her 
happiness will neither show her justified in resenting nor call the justification of  the resentment, 
itself, into question.24  Facts about her happiness will justify, or call into question, other activities.25
To understand what would either justify resentment or call it into question, we need to identify 
the right kind of  reason for it.  Elsewhere I use a puzzle about forgiveness to argue that the reasons 
proper to resentment might bear on one of  four questions: whether a wrong was done; whether you 
have a claim not to be thus wronged; whether the wrongdoer is a moral peer; and whether the 
wrong done poses an on-going threat to your moral standing.26  But whether or not one agrees with 
this specific account, if  one accepts that only certain reasons are proper, or internal, or of  the right 
kind, one will need to heed this difference, when thinking about the justification of  the attitude.  
Doing so will complicate our assessment of  their justification. 
1.5 CASE STUDIES
To illustrate, I will consider three case studies, each drawn from Scanlon’s recent paper “Forms and 
Conditions of  Responsibility.”
To begin, consider Scanlon’s treatment of  moral evaluation, Watson’s aretaic face.  Considering 
its justification, he says, 
If  the reactive attitude is simply moral evaluation… there is a question of  what reason we 
have for being concerned with other people’s moral quality.  This concern might seem like 
pointless grading unless it serves some practical or prudential purpose.  (92)  
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24 The same can be said about concerns about the wrongdoer’s opportunities to avoid being the target of  resentment.  
See "The Force and Fairness of  Blame," Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004).
25 I am relying on a principle: Strictly speaking, the reasons by which an individual can be justified or criticized for a 
rational activity (such as believing, intending, resenting, trusting, being proud) must be the kind of  reasons for which one 
might engage in that activity (they must be the right kind of  reason, bearing on, or being taken to bear on, the right 
question).  If, instead, you criticize or justify someone by appeal to other reasons (your resentment is making you so 
miserable; you should give it up), either your criticism is simply inapt or else you are really advocating, criticizing, or 
justifying some nearby activity of  self-management.  This seems foundational.  It seems to me one grain of  truth in 
“ought-implies-can.”  Thanks to the editors for asking for clarification.
26 "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 3 (2001). See also 
footnote 34, for the idea of  protest.
Scanlon accepts “pointless grading” as a possible criticism of  moral evaluation.  He thinks you 
might rebut the criticism if  you have good reason to evaluate others, and he hopes to show that 
concern for the nature of  your relations to others provides such reason.  
My concern with Scanlon’s position is subtle but, I think, crucial.  It is this: the charge of  
pointlessness cannot be leveled at the evaluation itself, but must apply to some other activity.  If, in 
the course of  a meeting, you repeatedly interrupt our colleague in an overtly rude way, I have 
adequate reason to conclude that you have been rude.  I cannot be charged with pointless grading 
simply because I form that belief.  Moreover, the problem with charging me with pointless grading is 
not that it would be unfair or objectionable to criticize me for doing something I cannot avoid 
doing.  The problem is deeper: it is that beliefs do not have points.  Beliefs are not formed or held 
for a purpose, and so the charge of  pointlessness cannot attach to the believing itself, but must 
rather attach to something else—something like patterns of  attention or activities of  investigation.27  
If  I sit down to re-grade last year’s homework assignments, it is the sitting down to grade, the 
spending my afternoon in that way, that is objectionably pointless.  My belief  that a particular 
assignment merits a C+ also has no point, but that is no criticism of  it.  
We can be more charitable to Scanlon and run into the same problem.  By “pointless grading” 
Scanlon is not meaning to level the charge I would face if  I were to sit down with last year’s 
homework.  I suspect he has in mind, rather, the charge of  a certain kind of  busybodiness or of  
indulging in a kind of  connoisseurship with respect to our fellow humans and their choices.  But 
even so, connoisseurs of  moral quality are objectionable, not simply because they form accurate 
opinions about the quality of  others’ wills, but because they go out of  their way to consider their 
quality, make the most of  any occasion for evaluation, and, perhaps most objectionably, take some 
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27 The charge of  judgmentalness seems to attach to some attitude which might accompany the belief.  But exactly what 
attitude is an interesting and difficult question.  See Watson, "Standing in Judgment."
sort of  pleasure or comfort in so doing.  But these activities and attitudes go beyond the accurate 
opinion.  Our criticisms must be matched to the non-voluntary attitude in question. 
The same problem appears in another case Scanlon considers, from a George Elliot novel.  In 
the novel, Miss Asher shares a meal with her suitor, Captain Wybrow.  She is off-put when he asks if 
she would like some jelly.  Asher thinks that, by now, Wybrow should have noticed that she never 
takes jelly.  This case entered philosophical discussion when Angela M. Smith used it to support of  
her view that we can be responsible for failures of  attention.28  John Martin Fischer and Neal 
Tognazzini objected, claiming that Wybrow cannot be responsible for his failure of  attention unless 
it can be traced to something he freely did or freely omitted.29  Scanlon defends Smith, noting first 
that, if  we consider positive responses, such as continued interest, the tracing requirement is 
implausible: Asher need not consider whether Wybrow freely made himself  attentive before 
responding to his attentiveness positively.  Scanlon then considers whether the tracing requirement 
should apply to negative reactions, reactions that impose a loss on their target.  
Scanlon accepts the possibility that a negative response from Asher could be shown unjustified 
by a loss to Wybrow, but he thinks that, in this case, as a “first-order, moral” matter, it is not.30  He 
says, “It is more than can be asked of  Miss Asher that she should accept an unconcerned and 
inattentive suitor as long as he has not freely chosen to be such a person.” (102)
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28 Angela M. Smith, "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life," Ethics 115, no. January (2005): 
pp. 242ff.
29 John Martin Fischer and Neal Tognazzini, "The Truth About Tracing," Noûs 43, no. 3 (2009).
30 Scanlon explains his methodology in the paragraph that spans pp. 98–99.  He says “the particular reactive attitudes… 
can be made appropriate simply by what a person’s normative attitudes in general are like.”  This sounds like the claim I 
am hoping to make: the right kind of  reasons for the reactive attitudes are facts about the quality of  the other person’s 
will.  However, as Scanlon clarifies his claim, it seems he thinks that whether an attitude is “made appropriate” is “a first-
order moral thesis about when we do and when we do not owe it to others not to modify our attitudes towards them in 
these ways.”  If, by “first-order moral thesis,” Scanlon means “a thesis to be established by ordinary contractualist 
reasoning,” then I disagree: insofar as these reactive attitudes are non-voluntary, their  justification will be insensitive to 
many of  the considerations to which contractualist reasoning is usually open. 
 This seems to me the wrong thing to say.  If  we were considering the justification of  a 
voluntary action, such as marrying Wybrow, or picking him up from the airport, then what Scanlon 
says would make sense: we would be confronting a “first-order, moral” question, and a loss to 
Wybrow would be, in principle, relevant.  We could ask whether, in light of  some loss to Wybrow, 
Asher could be required to marry him, and we could give an immediate answer: it is too much to 
ask.31  
But if  we are considering, instead, withdrawing interest or being off-put, then the loss to 
Wybrow seems irrelevant.  It seems to be the wrong kind of  reason.  Asking Asher not to be off-put 
by Wybrow’s inattention, because of  some loss he incurs, is like asking her not to resent Wybrow for 
disrespecting her, because it damages his self-esteem; or asking her to find him the most handsome 
man around, because it would improve his mood; or asking her to believe something false, because it 
would help everyone get along.  To say it is too much to ask undersells the problem.  It is an absurd 
thing to ask.  One might say, modifying a complaint from Bernard Williams, that it is an assault on 
Asher’s integrity—it asks her to do something she has no reason to do.32  
But, again, if  the loss to Wybrow is the wrong kind of  reason for Asher to revise her response, 
then the justification of  the response, itself, is not called into question by it. 
Of  course, once we move from non-voluntary attitudes, such as belief  or resentment or being 
off-put, to their expressions or the communication of  such attitudes, then we are, at least often, 
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31 In conversation Scanlon clarified that he meant, by “accept an unconcerned and inattentive suitor,” marriage.  Thus 
my criticism does not apply to his intended meaning.  
32 Williams was concerned about cases in which a person has no reason to do what they are required to do because of  
contingent features of  their “motivational system.”  I am focusing, instead, on cases in which a person is being asked to 
respond to a reason of  the wrong kind—a reason that does not bear on the right question to enable the response 
imagined.  In fact I think that Williams’ criticisms of  both utilitarian and Kantian moral theories can be well understood 
if  one interprets Williams as seeing the theories as relying on the wrong kind of  reason for virtuous actions.  (Virtuous 
actions, unlike ordinary voluntary actions, are subject to something like a wrong kind of  reason problem.)  See Bernard 
Williams, "A Critique of  Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism:  For and Against, ed. J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).  and "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck (1981).  For an 
argument that Williams’ concerns are grounded in his internalism, see Pamela Hieronymi, "Internal Reasons and the 
Integrity of  Blame," (1996). website.  For the suggestion that reasons of  the wrong kind underlie Williams’ criticisms see 
"Virtue and Its Imitation" (Harvard University, 2000), chapter 5.
considering voluntary actions.  Speaking, e.g., is a voluntary action; one can choose not to speak or 
choose to speak insincerely.  As with any voluntary action, the justification of  speech can be 
questioned in light of  burdens on others.  In fact, Scanlon’s strategy for justifying moral reactions, by 
appeal to the importance of  the quality of  a person’s will and the norms governing the specific 
relationship, seems to me correct, when applied to voluntary expressions and communications.  I 
would only add this observation: once we recognize that the attitudes expressed are, themselves, 
non-voluntary, we have available an additional set of  reasons by which to justify their voluntary 
expression: considerations of  integrity, honesty, or authenticity.  
I would like to consider one last set of  examples from Scanlon.  He considers both our 
responses to children and our responses to psychopaths.  He notes that we do not properly resent 
the wrongs done to us by children, even in cases in which the child fully understands both the 
consequences and the significance of  their action—that is, even in cases in which the child displays 
genuine ill will or malice.  He says this is because our relationship with children is not one of  moral 
equality but rather one of  nurturing and care-giving.  As he puts it, 
our reactions to children are limited by the duties of  care that are part of  our relations with 
them… our proper responses to children’s misbehavior are dominated by the aim of  
promoting their moral improvement.  So the appropriate response to thoughtless or 
insulting behavior by a child… should mainly be guided by the aim of  helping the child to 
learn how to do better…. (104). 
While I agree that resenting a small child for even extreme ill will is inapt, I am not convinced it is 
our duties or aims with respect to the child’s moral improvement that explains why.  My doubts are 
brought out by Scanlon’s treatment of  the psychopath.  
Scanlon thinks the ill will of  a psychopath rightly elicits resentment, but the fact of  mental 
illness generates duties that require us to act in ways other than our resentment might incline us.  He 
notes that, unlike in the case of  children, our resentment of  psychopaths is not undermined by these 
duties, but simply in tension with them.  But now we encounter a puzzle: why do our duties 
undermine resentment in one case and not in the other?  
18
I suspect it is because it is not our duties or aims that explain the inappropriateness of  resenting 
small children.  When resentment is undermined by the fact of  childhood, it must be because one 
has revised one’s take on one of  the questions or commitments internal to resentment, and I doubt 
that aims of  nurture or duties of  care are relevant—as is shown, I think, by the case of  the 
psychopath.  My own, controversial, opinion, built on my own analysis of  resentment, is that we do 
not resent the ill will of  small children because we do not see their ill will as a threat to our standing.  
In contrast, ill will from an adult can be a threat, even if  that adult is suffering from a disease such as 
psychopathy or narcissistic personality disorder.  If  the actions and choices of  such adults have not 
been in some way marked or contained by society—if  the psychopath or narcissist is running a 
corporation or a country, for example—they are threatening and remain a proper object of  
resentment.  But, again, this opinion is controversial.  The important point is that our duties, or facts 
about the nature of  our relationships, will not show a reaction such as resentment inapt unless they 
undermine the reasons proper to it. 
I hope these case studies illustrate the way in which the justification of  a non-voluntary reaction, 
such as resentment or indignation or distrust, will be more complicated than the justification of  a 
voluntary action, such as speaking or marrying or sanctioning.  The justification of  a non-voluntary 
attitude must be constrained and informed by the nature of  the attitude itself, taking into account 
the difference between the right and the wrong kind of  reasons for it.
1.6 FURTHER QUESTIONS OF JUSTIFICATION
But a large issue remains outstanding.  We can grant that the reactive attitudes are not voluntary, and 
we can grant that they are not sanctions, but, even so, they are still our activities—they are attitudes 
for which we can be asked our reasons, manifestations of  our take on the world, unlike our bone 
structure or our birthplace.  They are also, in some sense, our collective creation, a part of  our culture. 
And so their nature is not simply beyond or outside questions of  justification.   
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On the other hand, we are not able, either individually or collectively, to immediately or directly 
revise the nature of  these reactions—any more than we would be able, either individually or 
collectively, to immediately or directly change the meaning of  a word or alter the significance of  a 
gesture or a flag.  This is another way in which they differ from sanctions or penalties—and also 
from rules of  a game or positive law.  
Still, to say that we cannot immediately or directly revise them is not to say that they cannot be 
revised—we might, together, take actions that change them.  And so, again, they are not entirely 
beyond criticism.
At this point let us consider, very briefly, a recent suggestion by Miranda Fricker. 
Fricker presents a very different way of  thinking about the justification of  blame.33  She says, 
roughly, that blame may be justified if  it is justified in its paradigm case, which she calls 
“Communicative Blame.”  Communicative Blame is a specific form of  “second-personal 
interaction,” in which one person “finds fault” with another and communicates the judgment of  
fault to him or her “with the added force of  some negative emotional charge.” (172)  Fricker claims 
that this form of  exchange has an aim: to bring the wrongdoer to “feel sorry for what they have 
done,” in particular, to feel “remorse.”  In the course of  the typical exchange, either the wrongdoer 
is led towards remorse or the blamer is led away from finding fault.  Either way, the exchange 
functions to achieve what Fricker calls “increased alignment of  moral understanding.”  It may also 
serve to shift the motivations of  the parties into greater alignment.  Insofar as its paradigm case 
works towards these worthy aims, Fricker thinks blame can be vindicated.
I would have serious misgivings about Fricker’s view if  it required the blamer to adopt these 
aims—if  it required the blamer to aim at remorse or at increased alignment of  moral understanding 
or motivation.  However, Fricker says this is not so: “This aim [of  eliciting remorse] need not of  
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33 Fricker.
course be present as an intention in the psychology of  the communicative blamer; rather the aim is a 
function of  the type of  speech act it is, the nature of  its illocutionary point.” (173)  Fricker’s 
justification applies to what she calls a practice, a certain social form, rather than to the actions or 
attitudes of  an individual.  
How does this help?  We have already seen that the mere fact that an attitude has a function or 
serves a purpose does not mean that I adopt it in order to fulfill the function or achieve that purpose: 
recall my trust and pride in my children.  So the reactive attitudes may serve various purposes in our 
social lives together—perhaps they serve the functions of  Fricker’s Communicative Blame: to elicit 
remorse, align understanding, and provide motivation.  But, if  these are, as I suspect, reasons of  the 
wrong kind for these reactive attitudes, then a person could not adopt them for these reasons, nor 
could these reasons justify the individual in resenting or admiring or feeling grateful.  The social 
function of  an attitude may turn out to be the wrong kind of  reason for it.34  
Fricker extends the point to speech acts, which are voluntary.  Perhaps it can be so extended.  
Though I am doubtful, I will not further explore her view here.
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34 In “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” I suggested that resentment responds, in part, to the fact that a 
wrong done to you, if  not in some way marked as wrong, poses a kind of  threat to your on-going moral status.  
Resentment, I said, protests the wrong done, and so marks it as a wrong.  It responds to the threat.  That suggestion has 
recently been taken up by those who see the reactive attitudes as a kind of  communication.  But I am also on record 
claiming that resentment is not a form of  communication—is not a communicative act.  It can seem that I am being 
inconsistent—protesting, one might think, is definitely a voluntary communicative act, and if  resentment is a form of  
protest, then it should also be a communicative act.   
What I would like to say is this: Resentment functions, in our social life, to mark a wrong as wrong, and so functions as a 
protest, but, when I resent, I am not thereby engaging in a voluntary communicative action.  I do not resent in order to 
protest or in order to mark the wrong as wrong.  Rather, I react to the threat posed to my standing or status with 
resentment.  Although my resentment functions, in our social life, to mark the wrong as wrong, and so functions as a kind 
of  protest, that is not my aim or purpose.  (If  it were, then in those cases in which I thought it best, all things considered, 
to keep quiet, I would, for that reason, rationally revise my resentment).   
Even so, there may be some sense in which, as I resent, I am taken up, in some way, into the social form of  protesting or 
communicating—just as, if  I take pride in my children’s accomplishments, I may be in some way taken up into the 
project of  encouraging their personal development.  I think we can allow for this without saying what seems false—that 
pride or resentment can be adopted in order to protest or in order to encourage personal development.  Clearly more 
should be said on this topic.
Rather, I will simply note that we need to divide questions of  justification in more complex ways—
in ways that Strawson anticipated.  We need to heed the difference between asking whether an 
individual is responding as she has reason to respond, within a given system of  moral expectations 
and reactions, and asking, instead, whether that system, itself, should be revised in some way—
whether there is reason to try to change parts of  it.  We should heed the difference between those 
questions while noting they may interact—if  the system is flawed, then the most ideal reaction of  an 
individual within it may recognize that flaw in some way.  Nonetheless, the two questions are 
distinguishable, and both must be separated from a third: the wholesale skeptical question of  
whether we are ought to participate in any such system, at all.   
Having thus divided the question, I believe it will become clear that the first and second require 
careful ethical reflection.  I have been at pains to emphasize that answering them will require 
heeding the distinction between the right and the wrong kind of  reason, and so will require a more 
complex form of  reasoning than answering questions about the permissibility or appropriateness of  
an ordinary action.  
I will give one example of  the way in which a system of  moral expectations and reactions might 
be flawed and might be changed.  I suspect that we have, at work in our culture (and in so our 
philosophical discussion), at least two distinguishable forms of  resentment, which I have elsewhere 
labeled resentment-plus and resentment-minus.35  Resentment-minus is a reaction to the threat 
posed by the disregard of  a mind that matters.  It carries no commitments about whether the other 
mind could reasonably be expected to have avoided that disregard.  Resentment-plus adds this extra 
commitment—it commits to the claim that, if  the wrongdoer had taken reasonable steps, had, e.g., 
paid attention and tried harder, the disrespect would have been avoided.  Because of  the additional 
commitment, resentment-plus will be rationally undermined and unjustified in cases in which 
resentment-minus is not.  I believe that once we recognize our place in nature—once we see that we 
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35 Hieronymi, "Reflection and Responsibility."; "Forgiveness, Blame, Reasons...".  
are not free spirits—we will recognize that resentment-plus is often inappropriate.  Often enough, 
given a person’s personal and developmental history, a particular episode of  disrespect could not 
have been avoided by taking steps we could reasonably expect to have been taken.  Certain people 
are, due to their personal and developmental history, too insensitive, or too insecure, or too staked 
on certain ideals or institutions or ways of  life, to recognize certain of  their actions or attitudes as 
disrespectful to others.  Moreover, they came to those vices in ways we could not reasonably expect 
them to have avoided.  That is tragic, but their disrespectful action or attitude is no less disrespectful, 
for the tragedy.  Resentment-plus is inappropriate, but resentment-minus is not.
If  our previous views about our place in nature provided us, as a culture, with only resentment-
plus—because we thought each free spirit could always, with a little more effort, do the right thing
—then, when we learn we are mistaken, we will need to avail ourselves of  an alternative.  We could 
then recognize resentment-minus.36  The system, itself, may need to be revised—though, again, this 
is not an individual nor even a collective decision, but more of  a process.  And, in that process, the 
most ideal response of  an individual within the system might recognize the difficulty—they may, 
e.g., make explicit that their response does not carry the inappropriate commitment.   
1.7 SUMMARY
Thus far, I hope to have made convincing the idea that many reactions to moral failing are non-
voluntary and therefore subject to a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem and that heeding this is crucial 
when considering the justification of  such reactions, because whether a person has adequate reason 
for such an attitude depends only on reasons of  the right kind.  In the examples considered, facts 
about our duties, about losses to others, and even about the nature or importance of  our 
relationships, do not necessarily constitute the right kind of  reason for adopting or changing a given 
attitude.  And, if  they are the wrong kind of  reason for adopting or changing the attitude, they are 
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36 I consider this possibility in "Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of  Morals,"  (in progress).
also the wrong kind of  reason for challenging it.  For any non-voluntary reaction, we run the danger 
of  either questioning its justification or attempting to justify it with reasons of  the wrong kind.  
Moreover, determining which are the right kind of  reasons is not a matter of  straightforward moral 
reasoning.  It requires careful philosophical and psychological excavation.
I then made the further observation that these non-voluntary attitudes are not a fixed part of  
nature, but a kind of  social product, somewhat like language or symbol.  They may serve certain 
social purposes, and they may change over time.  But the purposes they serve may be the wrong kind 
of  reason for them—it may be that an individual cannot adopt them for those reasons, as sincere or 
authentic forms of  the attitude.  And, although they may change over time, they are not directly 
subject to the decision-making of  any individual or even collective body.  Nonetheless, they are not 
beyond revision, and so not beyond questions of  justification, as I tried to illustrate. 
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MORAL FAILURE AND REACTIONS THERETO
But there is yet a further set of  points to make.  To start, rewind to 1972.  Late that year, Carly 
Simon released a hit single, “You’re So Vain,” the refrain of  which says, “You’re so vain. / You 
probably think this song is about you. / You’re so vain. / I’ll bet you think this song is about you, / 
don’t you, / don’t you?”  The verses each address a wealthy womanizer from the point of  view of  a 
jilted lover.  Part of  the hook of  the song is the apparent contradiction in its refrain: Surely the song 
is about the person to whom it is addressed, whose extravagant lifestyle is described in fine detail in 
its verses—how could it be otherwise?  What could she mean, implying it is not about him?  
The puzzle could be resolved with the thought that a different man is addressed in each verse 
(several candidates have been put forward, over the years).  Any one man who thinks the song is 
about him, in particular, would then be mistaken.  Or, perhaps the song is addressing an entire type, 
any one of  which might think, wrongly, that it is specifically about him.  
But another way of  resolving the puzzle, one I much prefer, is with the thought that the song is 
not really about the person or persons to whom it is addressed, at all.  It is about the singer.  It is not 
24
about the womanizer; it is about his victim, who appears in the second verse.  The end of  that verse 
is repeated after the guitar solo:  “I had some dreams; / they were clouds in my coffee, / clouds in 
my coffee.”  Like cream stirred into coffee, her dreams were dissolved into the muck of  his ego.  
Her dreams are what he did not recognize, at the time, and will not appreciate, even now, despite her 
repetition of  the point.  He will hear her criticism, and he will correctly hear it as a criticism of  him, 
but, vain as he is, he will miss the source of  her criticism, in her mistreatment, and so miss its 
importance—it is criticism of him, but it is about her.37   
Likewise, I would like to say, apt moral criticism is criticism of  the wrongdoer, but it is about the 
one wronged.  If  you are the apt target of  blame, the blame is not really about you.38
To try to come at the point in another way: moral criticism points out moral failure, but the 
significance of  moral failure is not simply the significance of  a failure of  performance, even of  a 
failure to meet some extremely important or cherished standard.  Suppose you are an olympic 
athlete.  You love your sport.  You are enraptured by its beauty, or its grit, or its challenge to the 
limits of  human ability.  You spend your days and all your energy training.  You have at last secured 
your place in the world-wide competition.  When the time comes—you botch it.  Your focus is off; 
your muscles lag; you do not fight through the pain.  Your performance was below even your own 
personal average.  Afterwards, you are devastated, filled with disappointment and self-reproach at 
your failure to meet the standards of  human excellence that you and yours hold dear, to which you 
have devoted your life.  
My thought is that, if  this is how you experience a moral failure, or the realization that you have 
disregarded or disrespected another person, then you are missing something.  In fact, you are 
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37 On a nearby interpretation, the song is not only about the singer, but also about the other victims who appear at the 
end of  each verse (“…they’d be your partner… clouds in my coffee… wife of  a close friend…”).  
38 There are a handful of  verbal crutches I think philosophers should try to avoid whenever possible: modifiers such as 
“really,” “genuinely” or “metaphysical;” metaphors such as “internal/external,” “direct/indirect,” and “point of  view,” 
“standpoint,” or “stance;” and, finally, that particular use of  italics that is meant to shift, to the reader, the burden of  
locating the exact sense in which a word is meant.  In the last three sentences I have employed two of  these crutches.  At 
the moment, I can do no better.  I hope, in later work, to retire them. 
missing the most important aspect of  your situation: the fact that there is another person who has 
been disregarded, whose own importance has been overlooked, and who therefore now needs your 
attention, apology, and redoubled concern.  By falling into disappointment and self-reproach over 
your own failure, you risk once again overlooking the importance of  the other person.    
One might accept that the significance of  moral failure lies in the one wronged, and perhaps even 
accept the idea that the significance of  apt moral criticism lies there as well, and yet resist the idea 
that the same is true of  the other responses to moral failure that we have been putting under the 
head “blame.”  These responses are directed at the wrongdoer, one might think, in a different way: 
the wrongdoer is not merely their subject matter but also, so to speak, their target.  Thus, while one 
might accept that simple criticism is of  the wrongdoer but about the one wronged, one might insist 
that these other responses are about the wrongdoer in a more significant way.  For example, one 
might think the recording and performance of  “You’re So Vain” is, in fact, a clever way of  taking a 
bit of  revenge—a way for the singer to embarrass or strike back at the person who hurt her, in part 
by making the contradictory accusation.  
Perhaps it is.  But at this point we should again consider the difference between voluntary 
responses and non-voluntary reactions.  The recording and performance of  the song are voluntary 
actions, and, as such, they might be undertaken for an almost limitless number of  reasons, including 
reasons of  revenge, retribution, sanction, or penalty.39  But, while the recording and performance of  
the song are voluntary, other reactions are not: resentment, indignation, distrust, or contempt are 
not at our discretion in the way ordinary actions are; they can be adopted only for certain reasons.  
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39 Another purpose for the recording and performance of  the song seems to me more likely:  It is, I think, a way of  re-
affirming or asserting the singer’s own standing.  As I see it, the song is about the singer twice over.  First, as noted in 
the main text, it is about her dreams, feelings, and vulnerabilities as the source of  the criticism, which were overlooked 
first in the relationship and will again be overlooked in her criticism.  But, in its writing and performance, the song is also 
about the hard-earned confidence that enables her to showcase her vulnerability, even while anticipating that it will, 
again, be overshadowed by the self-concern of  the person criticized—even in the ears of  the audience.  (The wide, self-
confident grin on Carly Simon’s face, as she sings the song in the video from her 1987 concert, strikes me as a kind of  
confirmation.  Though perhaps others will see in it the satisfaction of  vengeance, I do not.)
These non-voluntary reactions are not only not well understood as sanctions or penalties, but are 
also, I think, not fit to be characterized, themselves, as revenge or retribution. 
Resentment and indignation might seem vengeful or retaliatory simply because they are angry or 
in some way aggressive.  But the fact that a response is angry or aggressive is not enough to secure 
the claim that it is retribution or vengeance.  Retribution and vengeance require an intention to cause 
something like harm or suffering.  Resentment and indignation do not.40  Moreover, for a response 
to count as retribution, it seems to me that it that it must be at one’s discretion in a way that would 
allow one to opt against it, to opt, perhaps, for mercy, and for a response to count as vengeance, it 
seems to me it must, in addition, be at one’s discretion in a way that would allow one to plot or plan 
it out over time.41  Thus retribution and revenge must, I think, be voluntary.42  
Now, to be sure, non-voluntary reactions to moral failure, such as resentment or indignation or 
disappointment, can be and too often are used to retaliate or to exact vengeance.  They are also used 
as sanctions or penalties.  Too often, people wield their emotional reactions, in their (voluntary) 
speech and actions, in order either to impose suffering on or to intentionally penalize the 
misbehavior of  coworkers, friends, and family members.  I lump these regrettable activities together 
under the head guilt-tripping.  
What is more, philosophers sometimes build moral theories in which, it seems, responses to 
moral failing are thought of  as moral sanctions or penalties that we, as members of  the moral 
community, impose on one another.  In fact, I think that this is the most natural form for the 
merited-consequences view of  responsibility to take.  Thought of  in this way, the blamer takes up a 
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40 I argue that resentment need not involve a desire to harm in "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness," pp. 359–
43.
41 For recent, insightful discussion of  mercy, see Adam Perry, "Government Mercy,"  (in progress).
42 Once we notice the difference between thinking that the fact of  wrongdoing warrants the voluntary imposition of  
some hardship or suffering (whether as sanction, penalty, retribution, or revenge) and thinking that the fact of  
wrongdoing warrants some non-voluntary response (like resentment, indignation, or distrust), we should see that the 
person who insists that a non-voluntary response is not undertaken for any further purpose is not, thereby, endorsing a 
retributivist account of  blame. 
role analogous to that of  parent or teacher or state or governing body of  a sport, as an enforcer of  
moral standards—the blamer presumes some kind of  authority, in imposing the sanction.  Certain 
theories aim to explain when and why someone can rightly exercise that authority.  The challenge is 
to avoid paternalism, manipulation, or an illicit presumption of  power—to preserve autonomy 
within this regime.
Although I suspect that many people, in ordinary life, do think of  themselves as penalizing or 
imposing moral sanctions in response to ordinary interpersonal wrongs—imposing negative 
consequences for the misbehavior of  neighbors, friends, and family members—I would like to set 
this aside.  It is, to my mind, a dubious practice, one that perhaps warrants a defensive response 
from its target.  But this kind of  moral sanctioning is not the central or most important response to 
ordinary interpersonal failing among adults, and reacting to a wrong done with resentment, 
indignation, or distrust is not, by itself, a form of  sanctioning: it is not, by itself, attaching a negative 
consequence to a wrong for a purpose.43  
Notice that we can deny that these non-voluntary reactions are forms of  sanction while allowing 
that they may well serve the social function of, say, providing a disincentive—just as my pride 
functions to build my children’s self-esteem.  Insofar as sanctions also function as a disincentive, the 
theories that characterize blame as a sanction may be close to the truth.  However, once we 
understand these reactions as non-voluntary, we can see that, when I resent what you have done, I 
am not doing so in order to provide a disincentive—even if  my resentment in fact provides a 
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43 Likewise, I strongly doubt that responses of  “opprobrium” or “judgment” (where “judgment” somehow goes beyond 
mere belief  or evaluation and means something more like “personal condemnation”) are, themselves, forms of  
sanctioning.  However, I find these responses difficult to understand—hard to theorize.  I am suppressing them, for the 
moment, because I am not sure what to say about them—other than that I find them immensely unattractive.   (I am 
also being purposefully silent about punishment.)
A different dynamic to note:  While blamers sometimes use their emotions as a kind of  sanction, from the other side, 
those who are charged with wrongdoing sometimes use their emotional reactions to the accusation (which can range 
from offense to distress to despair) as a way to direct attention away from the wrong, and away from the victim, and 
back towards themselves—to turn themselves into the victim-of-the-moment.  This dynamic appears, for example, in 
cases of  “white fragility.”  See Robin DiAngelo, "White Fragility," International Journal of  Critical Pedagogy 3, no. 3 (2011).    
disincentive and I know this.44  The nature of  the attitude will not allow it to be adopted for that 
purpose (though, again, if  I feel resentment, I may then go on to use my emotion, in my voluntary 
speech and actions, for that purpose, or for other purposes).  And so, even though my resentment 
may provide a disincentive, I am not imposing a sanction.
I hope I can now begin to say what seems off, or askew, about the merited-consequences conception 
of  responsibility.  The idea of  “merit” can invite the thought that certain consequences are 
“deserved,” where the idea of  “desert” is not the innocent thought that certain responses are 
warranted or apt or made appropriate by certain actions or attitudes, but is instead somehow caught 
up with the idea of  retribution, penalty, or punishment.45  Thus blaming can be confused with 
sanctioning or retribution.  In response, one might clarify that the idea of  “merit” is simply the more 
neutral claim of  appropriateness or aptness (as many in the literature would insist).  Even so, the 
tendency to characterize responses to moral failing as voluntary—as the sort of  thing one can adopt 
or refrain from for any reason—will reinforce an already-latent tendency to see anything beyond 
negative evaluation as a kind of  unwelcome treatment that the blamer, at their discretion, imposes 
on the wrongdoer.  The wrongdoer, as the target of  this supposedly discretionary treatment, then 
becomes the focus of  our theoretical attention, as the passive side of  the exchange, while the one 
wronged, the victim, who stands in need of  recognition, is instead subjected to questioning, to a 
request for justification.  
We can thus end up adopting, as theorists, the same defensive posture it is all too natural to 
adopt, in life, when charged with wrongdoing: when you are charged with wrongdoing, when you are 
the target of  a blaming response, it is natural to feel something is being done to you, that you are 
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44 Another example: My grief  may function to elicit in you both sadness and eagerness to aid.  But I do not grieve in 
order to make you sad or eager to aid.  Cf. Fricker’s purposes of  aligning understanding and motivation.  In footnote 33 
I noted that I may be in some way taken up into the function of  building my children’s self-esteem.  The same vague 
caveat should apply here.
45 I confess that I find the use of  “desert,” in the literature about responsibility and punishment, baffling.
undergoing some treatment or being punished in some way, and it is natural to object that the 
treatment is unjustified or unwarranted and to reach for any and all available considerations to call it 
into question.46  Likewise, as theorists, we characterize responses to moral failing as a treatment or 
consequence imposed on the wrongdoer by the blamer, we question its justification, and we are 
tempted to allow any and all available considerations to call it into question—as we would, if  it were 
an ordinary action.  
When we do so, we show that we have not fully appreciated Strawson’s thought that the reactive 
attitudes are reactive—they are, as he put it, our reactions to our perception of  the quality of  
another’s will.47  These attitudes have their own logic or structure, so to speak, which is narrowly 
focused, by the nature of  the attitude, on only certain features of  the situation.  
Once we appreciate that certain reactions are non-voluntary, we must conclude that they are not 
consequences voluntarily imposed upon the wrongdoer by the blamer.  One might try to suggest 
that they are imposed upon the wrongdoer by the blamer in some non-voluntary way—but the 
language of  imposition seems off, here.  It seems there would be as much reason to say that the 
wrongdoer imposes the reactions upon the one wronged, by wronging them.  Rather than think of  
these reactions as imposed treatment, I think it better to think of  them as manifestations of  the way 
in which people matter to other people.   
In resisting the idea of  imposed treatment, I am tempted to say that being the target of  
resentment or of  indignation is more like suffering from a hangover than like being sent to your 
room: it is, in a sense, a natural consequence of  your disrespect or disregard of  others.  
But, while it might be more like a hangover than a sanction, it is importantly unlike a hangover: 
to characterize the reaction as a purely natural consequence, like a hangover, puts the reactor in bad 
faith.  Although these reactions are non-voluntary, they are neither involuntary nor out of  one’s 
30
46 Like judgmentalness, defensiveness has received surprisingly little philosophical attention.
47 Strawson, pp. 83–84.
control—they are, in the sense earlier considered, up to the person reacting, something that person 
can revise and can be criticized for.  Better, I think, to say they are manifestations of  the way in 
which people matter to other people.  Again, mattering, not meriting, seems to me central.
If  you are found out in some wrongdoing, a blaming response is about you, insofar as it is a reaction 
to the perceived quality of  your will, as a will that matters.  But it is not—or, it is not necessarily and 
in the best case it is not—treatment voluntarily imposed upon you, and so not about you in that way. 
Nor should we think the most important thing about these reactions is how burdensome they are 
for the wrongdoer.  In the best case, that burden is not among the blamer’s reasons and is irrelevant 
to their justification.  What is important is what the reactions reveal.  And, the important thing they 
reveal is not the fact that you have failed, but rather the fact that someone else was wronged.   So, in 
another, perhaps more important sense when you are blamed, the blame is not really about you.48
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48 I am grateful to many for comments and conversation, including Rachel Achs, Facundo Alonso, Selim Berker, Sarah 
Buss, Jenna Donohue, Michael Hicks, Mark C. Johnson, Christine Korsgaard, Doug Kremm, Richard Moran, Gaile 
Pohlhaus, Darien Pollock, Ronni Sadovsky, T. M. Scanlon, Angela M. Smith, my graduate seminar at UCLA in Fall 2016, 
the UCLA Legal Theory Workshop, the Harvard Ethics Workshop, and audiences at Harvard University, the Conference 
in Honor of  Gary Watson,  Toronto University, UC Irvine, University of  Southern California, William and Mary, UT 
Austin, and Miami University of  Ohio.  Special thanks and gratitude are due to Gary Watson, for his inspiring 
philosophical work.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Clarke, Randolph, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith, eds. The Nature of  Moral Responsibility. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
DiAngelo, Robin. "White Fragility." International Journal of  Critical Pedagogy 3, no. 3 (2011): 54–70.
Fischer, John Martin, and Neal Tognazzini. "The Truth About Tracing." Noûs 43, no. 3 (2009): 531–
56.
Fricker, Miranda. "What's the Point of  Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation." Noûs 50, no. 1 
(2016): 165–83.
Hieronymi, Pamela. "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness." Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 62, no. 3 (2001): 529–55.
———. "Believing at Will." Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (2009): 149–87.
———. "Controlling Attitudes." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 1 (March 2006): 45–74.
———. "The Force and Fairness of  Blame." Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 115–48.
———. "Forgiveness, Blame, Reasons..." In 3am: magazine, edited by Richard Marshall, 2013.
———. "Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of  Morals."  (in progress).
———. "Internal Reasons and the Integrity of  Blame." 1996.
———. "Reflection and Responsibility." Philosophy and Public Affairs 42, no. 1 (2014): 3–41.
———. "Responsibility for Believing." Synthese 161, no. 3 (April 2008): 357–73.
———. "The Use of  Reasons in Thought (and the Use of  Earmarks in Arguments)." Ethics 124, 
no. 1 (October 2013): 114–27.
———. "Virtue and Its Imitation." Harvard University, 2000.
Kavka, Gregory. "The Toxin Puzzle." Analysis 43 (1983): 33-36.
McKenna, Michael. Conversation and Responsibility.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Moran, Richard. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001.
Pereboom, Derk. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Perry, Adam. "Government Mercy."  (in progress).
Rosen, Gideon. "The Alethic Conception of  Moral Responsibility." Chap. 3 In The Nature of  Moral 
Responsibility, edited by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna and Angela M. Smith, 65–87. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Scanlon, T. M. "Forms and Conditions of  Responsibility." In The Nature of  Moral Responsibility, edited 
by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna and Angela M. Smith. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015.
———. What We Owe to Each Other.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Shoemaker, David. "Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of  
Moral Responsibility." Ethics 121 (2011): 602–32.
Smith, Angela M. "Moral Blame and Moral Protest." Chap. 2 In Blame: Its Nature and Norms, edited 
by Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini, 27–48. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
© Pamela Hieronymi
———. "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life." Ethics 115, no. January 
(2005): 236–71.
Strawson, Peter F. "Freedom and Resentment." In Free Will, edited by Gary Watson. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003.
Wallace, R. Jay. "Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments." In Reasons and 
Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of  T. M. Scanlon, edited by R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar and 
Samuel Freeman, 348–72. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Watson, Gary. "Standing in Judgment." In Blame: Its Nature and Norms, edited by Justin Coates and 
Neal Tognazzini. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
———. "Two Faces of  Responsibility." Philosophical Topics 24, no. 2 (1996): 227-48.
Williams, Bernard. "A Critique of  Utilitarianism." In Utilitarianism:  For and Against, edited by J. J. C. 
Smart and Bernard Williams, 75-150. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
———. "Internal and External Reasons." In Moral Luck, 101-13, 1981.
Wolf, Susan. Freedom within Reason.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Zimmerman, Michael J. "Varieties of  Moral Responsibility." Chap. 2 In The Nature of  Moral 
Repsonsibility, edited by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna and Angela M. Smith, 45–64. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
33
